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Introduction: A Jury Trial System or The Plea Bargain 
Machine?
If you asked a lawyer or a judge in the United States, “What is most distinctive about the US legal system?” the answer is almost certain to be one of two things, or 
possibly both. The first reference would be to a trial by jury – 
that is, when usually twelve members of the community are 
brought into the court, evidence is presented to them, and 
they determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. 
The second claim would be that we, in the United States, 
have an “adversarial system.” An adversarial system is one in 
which the parties, the prosecutor and defendants, are adver-
saries and they engage in a form of combat or conflict. The 
parties are solely responsible for bringing evidence before 
the court, while the judge in this system is relatively passive. 
The judge has no responsibility to investigate or indepen-
dently bring facts to the case. The judge plays the role of a 
neutral referee or umpire to make sure that the rules are not 
violated in the production of this evidence. So, it is a form of 
combat, but it is important to recognize that it is a regulated 
form of combat rather than a free-for-all. 
However, this event, the jury trial, that is nominally 
so typical, almost never happens. The overwhelming per-
centage of criminal cases in the United States, upwards of 
90%, are resolved not by adversarial combat, but rather 
by cooperative negotiation, known as plea bargaining. 
Plea bargaining is a negotiation between the prosecutor 
and defense about the disposition of the case, with the 
occasional participation of the court.
The Plea Bargain Machine
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My purpose here is to explain this apparent paradox, 
whereby a system that describes itself as a “jury trial system,” 
in fact becomes “the plea bargaining machine.”
My argument is based primarily on my own experience 
as a deputy public defender in San Francisco. I tried, myself, a 
number of jury trials and I plea bargained probably thousands 
of cases, and I was witness to thousands of other cases that 
were negotiated in my presence by other attorneys. Accord-
ingly, this is not a historical account. I do not purport to ex-
plain how the plea bargaining system arose in time, although 
the argument would be consistent with several accounts of 
the historical rise of plea bargaining. Still, the reasons that a 
practice develops are not necessarily identical to those which 
maintain it and by which is it rationalized in the present. The 
presentation here addresses how plea bargaining functions 
today and how people who are engaged in it think about it.
This is also not a systematic comparative presentation, 
and I am not an expert in Brazilian criminal procedural 
practices. Still, I have done some research on Brazilian 
criminal justice, and there are some features of US prac-
tice that are deliberately included here to highlight differ-
ences between the two systems. Hopefully this will provide 
true experts in Brazilian practices with a building block for 
making their own comparisons. 
First I will elaborate on jury trial practices. Then I will 
shift to discussing plea bargaining itself. I do this because 
jury trial and plea bargaining are linked. Plea bargaining 
cannot truly be understood except in relation to jury trial. I 
will close with some conjecture about why the US legal sys-
tem continues to represent itself, or to misrepresent itself, as 
an “adversarial system” defined by the jury trial when in fact 
it is the plea bargaining machine.
The Structure of US Criminal Justice
The argument is somewhat schematic. Our political 
and our legal organization in the United States is a fed-
eral system in which all 50 states are distinct sovereigns. 
The states reserve any powers that are not explicitly del-
egated in our federal constitution to our national govern-
ment. The “police power,” which comprehends the power 
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to define crimes and to prosecute them, is one such power 
reserved by the states. We do have a federal criminal sys-
tem, but there are relatively few federal crimes. The vast 
majority of criminal prosecutions on an annual basis in the 
United States are conducted at the state level.
I will not pretend that there are no variations in pro-
cedures and practices from state to state. There are differ-
ences. However, these interstate variations are not great, at 
least as compared to differences between, for example, the 
US system and the Brazilian system. For example, all 50 
states and the federal system employ jury trials for offenses 
leading to incarceration. However, 39 of our 50 states per-
mit juries of fewer than twelve people, down to as few as 
six for misdemeanor offenses (relatively minor offenses that 
generally carry punishments of two years or less, although 
it varies from state to state). Forty eight of the states require 
jury unanimity for a conviction, meaning all jurors have to 
agree on the verdict, while two do not. There are many other 
procedural differences of this scale between states. 
I will explain a few of the reasons for this general simi-
larity. To begin with, our federal constitution was modeled 
after the constitutions of the original thirteen colonies. Al-
most all of our state systems look to the British common 
law system for inspiration. Following our Civil War the 
14th Amendment was passed, holding that state govern-
ments could not deprive US citizens of life, liberty, or the 
pursuit of happiness without due process of law. Through 
this amendment, it was gradually held that all of the states 
had the same obligations to criminal defendants as did the 
federal government, thus promoting a level of national 
uniformity in criminal procedures.
The Jury Trial
Let us examine US jury trials via a series of ques-
tions. First, what is the theory behind jury trials? Why 
do we have them to begin with? Next, how do juries get 
formed? Where do they come from? Third, what sorts 
of rules of evidence are employed at jury trials? Finally, 
how are juries supposed to arrive at verdicts? Detailed 
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responses will be provided below. Hopefully there will 
be many points of learning along the way, but the over-
arching point is that a jury trial, at least one conducted 
according to contemporary procedural requirements, is 
an extremely cumbersome and costly affair. It is an orga-
nizational feat to conduct one. It is at high cost in both 
institutional and social resources. All of these costs are 
key to understanding plea bargaining.
Pretrial Litigation
While we focus on trial, which in the US system 
is definitely the main event in a criminal prosecution, 
please be aware that some cases involve substantial pre-
trial litigation, and almost all cases have at least some 
pretrial litigation. All felony cases, which are more seri-
ous cases involving a punishment of anywhere from one 
year to death, in California, have a preliminary hearing. 
A preliminary hearing is a court proceeding in which the 
prosecutor is obligated to bring forth evidence, typically 
in the form of live witness testimony and physical evi-
dence, to establish probable cause that the defendant has 
committed the crime. It is an early preview of the trial. 
The formal legal purpose of the preliminary hearing is 
to screen out weak cases and to ensure that only cases that 
have a substantial evidentiary basis go forward. Another 
common example of a kind of pretrial litigation would be 
a motion to strike a prior. Many offenses in the US legal 
system involve allegations of prior convictions. These pri-
or convictions, when a person has previously been found 
guilty of a crime, can be alleged in the formal charging 
document and if proven at trial by the prosecutor, can lead 
to more severe sentencing consequences for the criminal 
defendant than if he were just facing the offense without the 
prior. Litigation frequently focuses on whether these are, in 
fact, constitutionally valid priors. The defense lawyer will 
scrutinize the record of the prior conviction and try to ar-
gue to the court that the prior was an improper conviction 
and, therefore, cannot be used to elevate sentencing in this 
new case. There are many of other kinds of pretrial litiga-
tion, but now let us turn to examining jury trials.
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The Rationale for Jury Trial
What is the rationale behind jury trials? Why do we have 
them at all? There are two primary reasons. First, jury trials 
are thought of as a way to interpose the community between 
the individual and the state, and thus to offset the tremendous 
imbalance of power between the two. The state’s power is vast. 
The state has investigators, police, and professional prosecu-
tors. Prosecutors have the reputation and aura of state author-
ity. When that power is brought against an individual citizen, 
it can be crushing. The jury stands between the individual 
and the prosecuting authority to check the latter’s power and 
to protect the individual from persecution. That is one of the 
main reasons that we have jury trial. It is specifically concep-
tualized as an emanation of our United States national identity 
as individualists who are concerned with freedom from central 
authority.
The second justification for jury trials is that help us arrive at 
more accurate verdicts in criminal cases. Twelve minds are bet-
ter than one, and having multiple finders of fact at trial is there-
fore superior to having innocence or guilt determined by a lone 
judge. Jurors are representatives of the community, and bring di-
verse perspectives and a broad fund of everyday wisdom to the 
task of weighing evidence. After all, many judgments in criminal 
law involve assessments of human character, such as weighing 
the honesty or veracity of a witness. Likewise, jurors determine 
the likely intent of a criminal defendant. These are prudential 
matters, in which broad human experience can be essential. 
However, and this is important, the truth-finding mission 
of jury trials is consciously balanced by other considerations. A 
jury verdict is thought of as truth produced in a particular way 
with respect to particular rules. Let us call it “juristic truth” or 
“legal truth,” as opposed to absolute truth. This is manifested, 
for example, in our unwillingness to permit evidence that is de-
rived from involuntary statements of the defendant. If the de-
fendant has been coerced by trickery or tortured into an admis-
sion, we do not allow that admission into evidence even it can 
be established that the statement is true, for example by cor-
roborating evidence. We consciously do not permit probative 
relevant evidence because of the way it was obtained, preferring 
a truth that is produced according to a particular formula, with 
                        
772 George E. BisharatDILEMAS - Vol. 7 - no 3 - JUL/AGO/SET 2014 - pp. 767-795
respect to particular values and rules, to absolute truth.
Whether these rationales withstand scrutiny is not an is-
sue I will discuss here. It is debatable whether juries actually 
produce more accurate verdicts. That is not the concern – we 
are focusing now simply on how jury trial is rationalized.
There are two other characteristics that our juries 
should have. A jury is supposed to be a jury “of one’s peers” 
because to be tried by people who are totally unlike you 
and may be unsympathetic to your condition seems unfair. 
Next, a jury should be “impartial.” Impartiality means being 
neutral, at least as of the beginning of the case, not having 
any leanings toward one party or the other. 
Jury Selection
Assume you are convinced and ready to give jury trial a 
chance, what do you do next? Where does the jury come from? 
Recall that this is supposed to be a “jury of one’s peers” 
and also an “impartial” jury. You might imagine that find-
ing a “jury of one’s peers” could be a real procedural quag-
mire. Does the requirement mean that if the defendant 
is a plumber, you need twelve plumbers to hear evidence 
against him? Must rich defendants have only rich jurors? 
Do black defendants require twelve black jurors? Is that the 
meaning of a trial by a “jury of one’s peers?” In practice, and 
not surprisingly, the requirement of a “jury of one’s peers” 
amounts to little more than the right to have jurors from the 
same judicial district in which the crime is being tried.
Still, you have to round these people up from some-
where. How do we get them to the courtroom? How do 
they end up sitting in those twelve seats? In each county 
or judicial district, we have a local public official who is 
in charge of generating lists of prospective jurors. Gener-
ally this is done through searches of public records – voter 
registration lists, vehicle registrations, property records 
and the like. Prospective jurors are summoned by letter 
to appear in court to serve. Obviously, this does not snare 
everybody. There is a bias in this process in favor of middle 
and upper class people who vote, who have driver’s licens-
es, who have a home and a mailing address, who are not 
homeless, transient, or poor. Therefore, there is a certain 
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socioeconomic class bias already built in.
What about impartiality? How do we know whether ju-
rors are impartial, neutral or not? You cannot know that in ad-
vance, so the only way to find out is to ask them. And because 
some jurors will doubtless reveal some form of partiality, you 
will need a larger pool from which to select your twelve. It is 
also necessary to have a larger pool because, while jury duty 
is supposed to be a civic duty, the courts recognize that this 
duty can, in fact, impose hardships on people – such as single 
parents, self-employed people, and sick or disabled people. 
Many citizens, while they will report to the courthouse, view 
jury duty as onerous and time-consuming, and, accordingly, 
do their best when summoned to escape actually serving.
Thus, to generate a jury of twelve people, the typical jury 
pool that is ordered by a court to try a simple misdemeanor 
case would be as many as sixty people. By the way, it is never 
prudent to have only twelve jurors. What happens if one is 
sick or indisposed in the course of the trial and can’t attend? 
You either have to wait for that person to recover in order 
to resume trial or start over with a new jury because you 
cannot proceed with a juror who has only heard part of the 
evidence. So, depending on the expected length of the case, 
and, therefore, the odds that some juror will fall ill or oth-
erwise be indisposed, we always pick twelve jurors plus at 
least two alternates, and in most felony cases six alternates. 
In more serious and expected longer cases we might have 
twelve alternates. So, we are not just picking those who are 
actually serve as jurors, but alternates as well. Alternates sit 
through the trial and hear the evidence just like the twelve 
actual jurors, and then, if necessary, replace a sick juror so 
the case can continue without interruption.
Once a jury pool of sixty or so persons is assembled, the 
court clerk picks names randomly out of a hopper. Once a 
name is chosen out of the hopper, the chosen person sits in 
the jury box. This happens twelve times. These unlucky peo-
ple, as they see themselves generally, sitting in the jury box 
are then questioned for bias, initially by the judge. The court 
(as we often refer to the judge) questions them initially to 
make sure that the jurors meet the basic requirements, that 
they are actually residents of the judicial district, and that 
they understand English well enough. Many prospective ju-
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rors will be excused by the judge for reasons of hardship.
After the judge questions, typically the attorneys will 
get an opportunity to question for bias. Attorneys have the 
legal authority to challenge, that is, exclude, particular pro-
spective jurors. There are two kinds of challenges. The first 
kind is a challenge for cause, where an explicit reason is evi-
dent that this juror cannot serve impartially this particular 
case. For example, a jury candidate says, “My car was bur-
glarized one time. I don’t feel I can be fair or impartial in a 
case that involves auto burglary.” Another example would 
be someone saying, “My sister was raped, and I have such 
strong feelings about rape that I don’t think I can serve in 
this case.” In that situation the judge will say, “Despite that, 
can you be impartial, and put that out of your mind and only 
decide the case based on the evidence here?” And of course 
the juror will respond, “Yes, of course I can, Your Honor.” 
Everyone knows this is not true, but that is how it goes. 
It goes this way because of the other form of challenge, 
which is called a peremptory challenge. A peremptory chal-
lenge is one that the lawyer can make without having to 
justify it, based, for example, on an inarticulable hunch. In 
California, in a misdemeanor case, and in most felony cases, 
each attorney has ten peremptory challenges. In cases in-
volving life sentences or a capital punishment case or death 
case, each attorney has twenty-five of these peremptory 
challenges. The reason the court says to a prospective juror, 
“No, you are going to be fine, you can be impartial,” despite 
their open admission to the contrary is because the judge 
wants lawyers to burn up peremptory challenges to move 
the case along. That is the game with respect to challenges. 
The only limitation on peremptory challenges is that 
they are not supposed to be used in a discriminatory fash-
ion. For example, if you have an African-American defen-
dant and the prosecutor is excusing all the African-Amer-
ican prospective jurors, then you, as the defense attorney, 
can bring a challenge before the court that the challenges 
are being used in a racially discriminatory fashion. If there is 
prima facie evidence that this is true, the court should then 
probe the lawyer’s reasons, such as “Why did you exclude 
juror number six?” (juror number six is African-American). 
The attorney’s response could be, “Because he has a mus-
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tache and he has long hair and to me that is an indication 
that he is undisciplined and probably not sympathetic to the 
police.” Judges routinely accept these kinds of explanations 
for the exercise of peremptory challenges. So this supposed 
protection against discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges amounts, in reality, to not very much.
Each time a juror is excused, either for hardship, for 
cause or via a peremptory challenge, the hopper is spun 
and another juror is called up and the questioning starts all 
over again by the courts and the attorneys. Depending on 
the nature of the case, how serious, how complex, lengthy 
or sensitive, this process of jury selection, from herding 
all the jurors down to the courtroom to actually swearing 
them in at the start of the case takes at least half a day for a 
petty offense. In a serious case it can take weeks or months. 
With multiple codefendants – imagine, for example six 
people charged in one case, then six defense attorneys will 
all question the jurors. I, myself, tried a misdemeanor case 
in which the jury selection took three days and the trial it-
self took two days, so that can give you a sense of how time 
consuming jury selection can be.
We call the questioning of jurors voir dire, which 
comes from old French, meaning “to speak the truth.” The 
legal justification for voir dire is to reveal bias. That is all it 
is for. In reality, it is used by attorneys to begin to try their 
case and to persuade the jurors of their position. I might 
ask, as a defense attorney, “Have you, Juror X, ever heard a 
case of misidentification of a defendant by a witness? Are 
you aware that cross-racial identification in particular is 
unreliable?” I am starting to tell them my theory of the 
defense as I question them. They are not even on the jury 
yet, but I am starting to sell my case already.
Principles of Proof at Trial
Imagine we finally have our jury and are ready to pro-
ceed with trial. What are the principles and methods of 
proof that we employ at trial? First, we have a presumption 
of innocence. That is, as we begin the case at least, the de-
fendant is presumed to be not guilty and the burden of the 
proof is on the prosecutor. Generally, in our legal system, 
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the burden of producing evidence rests with the person 
that is making the affirmative claim. In a criminal case that 
is the prosecutor. A case wouldn’t happen if the prosecutor 
did not say, “This person is guilty.” The prosecutor is the 
moving party in a criminal case and shoulders the burden 
of proof. The standard of proof, that is the measure of how 
convincing the evidence must be, is proof “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” Next, the defendant has a privilege against 
self-incrimination. Fourth, character evidence is gener-
ally inadmissible. Next, the exclusionary rule is used for 
evidence that is illegally obtained by the police. Following 
that, we have a right of confrontation, the right to cross-
examine witnesses called by the opposing side, and the de-
fendant has the right to counsel. An indigent person who 
cannot afford to hire counsel is entitled to court-appointed 
counsel in any case that leads to imprisonment.
Let us review each of these principles briefly. The pre-
sumption of innocence means that the prosecutor must 
bring forth evidence proving the defendant’s guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If he or she fails in doing that, then the 
jury must find the defendant not guilty. The prosecutor goes 
first at each phase of the case. The case is generally divided 
into three phases: opening statement, in which the lawyers 
lay out what evidence they will show, followed by the pre-
sentation of testimony, and finally, closing argument, in 
which lawyers apply the law to the facts of the case. 
Another implication of the presumption of innocence 
is that the defendant is under no obligation to produce 
evidence and can argue at the close of the prosecutor’s 
case (through counsel, of course) “You have failed to meet 
your burden of proof. I do not need to show anything. You 
have not shown what you needed to show.” The prosecu-
tion is not permitted to comment on the defendant’s de-
cision not to present evidence. That is understood to be 
“burden shifting,” creating pressure on the defense to offer 
evidence. Yet there is no burden on the defense. 
This limitation on the prosecution demonstrates a 
slightly ambivalent attitude toward jurors. In our system we 
value jurors and expect them to reach a fair verdict, but we 
also slightly distrust them. They are not lawyers, and they 
may not be capable of the mental discipline of lawyers and 
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judges. There are many other procedural responses, espe-
cially rules of evidence that stem from this ambivalence. We 
shield jurors from information that we fear they may mis-
use. This is termed prejudice, in evidentiary terms, when a 
juror accepts certain evidence and uses it for the wrong rea-
sons and thinks about it the wrong way. 
Our concern over prejudice, in turn, influences the or-
der of events at trial. If there is a question about the admis-
sibility of evidence, it must be resolved before the jury hears 
about it and outside of their presence. That is because you 
“can’t unring the bell.” If the jury hears the bell, that is, the 
improper evidence, they lack the discipline to say, “When I 
think about this case I will ignore what I’ve just heard.” We 
don’t trust them to be able to do that. For that reason we 
resolve admissibility of evidence outside of jurors’ presence.
The standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. What does that mean? If you ask fifty different law-
yers, you would get fifty different answers because it is a ver-
bal formulation that cannot be quantified. We do have other 
standards of proof, proof of preponderance of the evidence, 
proof by clear and convincing evidence, and we know that 
these are lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But no 
one really knows what it means. Lawyers labor over analogies 
to have jurors think about reasonable doubt in the way that 
they prefer. But the standard of proof raises the bar for the 
prosecution, and increases the uncertainty of trial outcomes.
Character evidence is generally inadmissible. This stems 
from the basic idea in our criminal law that we prosecute 
people not for who they are, but rather for what they actu-
ally do. All of us probably have impure thoughts, but there 
is no interest in the community in curbing mere thoughts. 
It is only when we cross the line into action that criminal 
prosecution is appropriate. 
There are exceptions. For example, if a defendant in-
troduces evidence of good character, the prosecutor can 
rebut with evidence of bad character. Another is for char-
acter evidence for the trait of honesty and veracity. This is 
understood to be in question for every witness who takes 
the stand. Third is when evidence of specific acts of past 
conduct is relevant to prove something other than pure 
character. For example, if identity is in question and a 
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defendant’s past similar crimes have a “signature quality.” 
The question then becomes whether the probative value 
of past crimes evidence outweighs its potentially prejudi-
cial impact. This, of course, requires litigation outside of 
the presence of the jury because, as noted, we don’t trust 
them to be able to unring the bell.
Depending on the circumstances, hearings over admis-
sibility of evidence can be straightforward. Disputes regard-
ing facts, however, often require testimony and argument.
What happens when evidence is gathered by the police 
by illegal means? We exclude that evidence from trial. This 
can be seen as a form of compensation to the individual 
whose rights are abridged, a way to preserve judicial integ-
rity, and as deterrence against police conduct. 
The key point to understand about the exclusionary 
rule is that it leads to yet greater uncertainty about the 
outcome of a case. For example, as a defense attorney, I 
may read a police report and conclude that a search in the 
case was illegal. The prosecuting attorney may read the 
same police report and conclude the opposite. Litigation 
is required to resolve the issue. The police may give one 
version of the facts, while the defendant or possibly other 
witnesses give other versions. The exclusionary rule both 
causes the need for more litigation and introduces greater 
uncertainty into the ultimate outcome of the case, by cast-
ing the availability of some evidence into doubt.
The right of confrontation means the right for the de-
fendant to be present in court and look the witnesses in the 
eye and hear them denounce him personally and directly 
under oath. Defendants also have the right to cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses through counsel, so their story can 
be put to the test. The prosecutor has this same right if the 
defense brings in a witness. The notion is that this confron-
tation and cross-examination generates truth. People may 
say many things outside the court, but in the court, when 
staring the defendant in the eye, examined by both counsel, 
that is when the real truth will come out. 
There are two important procedural consequences of the 
right of confrontation that I want to highlight. The first is that 
the defendant must be present at any critical stage of the trial. 
The other is an evidentiary exclusion referred to as hearsay. 
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Hearsay is any statement made, not by a witness while tes-
tifying, that is offered in court for the truth of the matter as-
serted in the statement. That statement is deemed not reliable 
because it was not produced in these special circumstances 
of confrontation. Therefore, if a party wants a statement to 
be admitted into evidence, it means they have to produce 
the witness to testify. It is not sufficient to have someone else 
testify about what another has said. In a case with co-defen-
dants, each of them has the right of confrontation. So, you 
will have a direct or first examination by the prosecutor, and 
then you will have cross examination by two, three, seven, 
twelve – whatever number co-defendants there are. There are 
many exceptions to the general ban on hearsay evidence, but 
its tendency, nonetheless, is to create greater reliance on live 
testimony than on recorded statements.
If you think about all these technical rules of evidence 
and procedure, it should be evident that the average defen-
dant lacking legal training would be at huge disadvantage 
without a lawyer. In recognition of this, the United States 
Supreme Court, beginning in 1963, required states to ap-
point counsel at state’s expense for any indigent defendant 
facing felony charges. This right has since been extended to 
all felonies and any misdemeanors resulting in actual in-
carceration, no matter how briefly. Due to a lawyer’s ethical 
obligation to avoid conflicts of interests, co-defendants are 
typically represented each by his own lawyer.
How a Jury Functions
We have examined how juries are formed, how cases 
are presented to them and under what kinds of evidentiary 
restrictions. Now that the jury has the evidence, what are 
they supposed to do with it? How do they function? Juries 
are first and foremost finders of facts. They judge the cred-
ibility of witnesses. They determine whether the elements of 
offenses have been established by the prosecution. They de-
termine whether any affirmative defenses have been made.
The judge, on the other hand, is the referee between 
the two parties. The judge rules on procedural questions 
and the admissibility of evidence. He instructs the jurors 
through jury instructions, which may be written or oral, but 
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are directions to the jury about what they are supposed to 
do and what the applicable law is in the case. The jury is also 
instructed about appropriate jury behavior. They may not 
have any contact with the parties of the case or the lawyers 
during the case. They may not even discuss the case with 
each other until both sides rest. 
Jurors may only consider evidence that is actually pre-
sented in court. If they go home and read about the case on-
line or in the newspaper it is a form of jury misconduct and 
can lead to a case being overturned on appeal. Likewise, for 
example, in a driving under the influence case, if the ju-
rors go into the jury room and say, “those field sobriety tests 
don’t seem so difficult, let’s try them,” then they are produc-
ing evidence by themselves. That is regarded as improper.
Once all of the evidence has been submitted to the jury, 
both sides rest and closing arguments are made, the jurors 
are instructed by the court. They retire to a special room and 
they deliberate. Deliberate means they talk about the case and 
the evidence and they are supposed to decide, and ultimately 
vote on whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. They 
are entitled to request to inspect any physical evidence. They 
may ask for a read back of witness testimony, but, otherwise, 
there is very little interference from the court or parties. 
In 48 states, and in the federal system, there is a requirement 
of unanimity, meaning the jurors all must agree on a verdict. In 
simple cases, if the evidence is relatively clear, this can be done in 
a couple of hours. In complex cases, however, jury deliberations 
alone can last for weeks. If the jury is stuck, the courts will often 
urge then to persevere. However, if they truly reach an impasse, 
then the courts declare a mistrial and the whole case goes back 
to square one. That is a possible outcome.
Jury Costs
Against this backdrop of information, consider now what 
an administrative feat it is to orchestrate and conduct a jury trial, 
and at what expense. First, all the relevant actors – defendant(s), 
the witnesses, judge, court staff, lawyers, jurors – must be as-
sembled. Compare this to a trial by a single judge that is char-
acteristic of many other jurisdictions. That judge might prefer 
to hear all evidence at once, but, given adequate record keeping, 
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can afford to hear witnesses days, weeks, or even months apart.
Making twelve members of the community the 
finders of fact means everything must be done at one 
time, because reconvening them would be a logistical 
administrative nightmare, if not an impossibility. Bai-
liffs or sheriffs must bring the defendant to court, if 
in custody, and at any rate secure the courtroom at all 
times. Court reporters and court clerks must record 
activities. The judge must preside. Lawyers, who are 
typically paid at state expense, must be present. In per-
haps 75% of criminal cases, the defense counsel is ap-
pointed by the court, and paid by government funds. 
A jury must be convened through the methods I’ve 
described. All of these private citizens, by the way, are 
missing work. Although laws oblige employers to pay em-
ployees while they are on jury duty, this does not help 
the self-employed, and the employers are not compen-
sated for the loss of their employee’s work. Of course, 
far more citizens are inconvenienced by coming to the 
courthouse and enduring jury selection than those who 
actually serve. Witnesses also suffer substantial inconve-
nience. Just as an index of these costs, a recent proposal 
of the California Judicial Association to reduce number 
of jurors in misdemeanor cases from twelve to eight alone 
is estimated to bring savings to the State of California of 
tens of millions of dollars annually, and this does not 
count saved expenses for private employers. The simple 
fact is that we cannot afford to try our cases according to 
the rules that we have devised, at least not many of them.
We should further note a non-economic but significant 
cost of trial, which is the emotional toll it takes on lawyers, 
defendants, and often witnesses. Trials are always nerve-
wracking affairs, filled with last minute frantic preparation. 
Trials can be particularly gut-wrenching in sensitive cases 
like rape or child molestation, especially for victims. But, it 
is also hard for lawyers. I cross-examined a child victim in a 
child molestation case. That is an emotionally complex ex-
perience. It is not an easy thing to do.
The account to this point has been designed to dem-
onstrate what a costly, cumbersome and difficult thing it is 
to actually conduct a jury trial. These costs are essential to 
                        




Plea bargaining, in the most general sense, means nego-
tiations between the parties, the prosecutor and the defense, 
leading to the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea or the dispo-
sition of the case without trial. We will answer the following 
four questions: Who is involved? What is being exchanged, 
or what are the values that each side offers to the other? 
When does it occur? Where does it occur? 
After answering these four questions, I will offer fi-
nal observations about why we, in the US, continue to 
tout the jury trial system while, in fact, we operate the 
plea bargain machine.
Plea Bargaining Actors
First, who is involved in plea bargaining? The prin-
cipal actors are the prosecutor and the defense attorney. 
Judges are also often involved depending on their own per-
sonal preferences and also depending on the stage of the 
case. Judges tend to be less involved early and get more 
involved as the case approaches trial. Note that a central 
character, the defendant, is usually not directly involved 
in plea bargaining. It is the responsibility of the defense 
attorney to convey an offer of settlement to the defendant. 
The defendant decides whether to accept the offer or not, 
but otherwise, the defendant is absent.
Let us focus on each actor for a moment and draw 
out some underlying assumptions that rationalize their in-
volvement in this process. The prosecutor can only engage 
in the process of plea bargaining if he or she has authority 
of the disposition of the case. You cannot trade something 
that you do not possess or control. One of the structural 
foundations of plea bargaining is our strong tradition, in 
the United States, of prosecutorial discretion in charging. 
There is no compulsory prosecution in the United States 
as in some other systems, including Brazil. Prosecutors do 
not have to take a case forward if they do not see the need, 
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or do not see the necessary evidence. 
Victims, in our system, are not parties to the prosecu-
tion. We do not have private prosecution the way some sys-
tems do. They are simply witnesses in the case in which they 
happen to be victims. They have no direct authority over the 
disposition of the case.
The prosecutor, in our system, is part of the executive 
branch. The top prosecutor in a judicial district (the title var-
ies from state to state, but in California they are called district 
attorneys), is an elected official. Thus the check on abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion in charging is political. If citizens are 
discontent with a district attorney’s policies with respect to 
plea bargaining or anything else, their recourse is to vote him 
or her out of office in the next election cycle. There is very 
little legal control by the courts over the prosecutor’s discre-
tion in charging cases. If this were not the case, the prosecutor 
would have nothing to trade or offer the other side. Because of 
this tradition, the prosecutor is the one who holds the greatest 
authority over how a case is resolved.
Formally, the defense attorneys are held responsible for 
representing the best interests of their clients. They join plea 
bargaining as proxies, or representatives, of the defendant. 
In the division of authority over a case between a lawyer and 
a client, the defendant has exclusive authority over what plea 
to enter. It is solely the defendant’s choice to plead not guilty 
or guilty. In practice, of course, attorneys have great power 
over this decision and that power is exercised in how they 
position an offer for settlement to the defendant. A lawyer 
who can get the defendant to do what he or she thinks is 
best is often praised, especially by judges, but also by other 
lawyers, as exercising “good client control.”
Although the attorney is supposed to solely represent 
the defendant, in fact, attorney-client relations are rife with 
tensions. Defense attorneys, as a matter of actual practice 
– not the way they think about it, but in fact – perform the 
role of disciplining the client to accept a plea to the benefit of 
lawyers, the court, themselves, and sometimes to the detri-
ment of the defendant him or herself. 
The way defense lawyers typically rationalize this – 
and I know this because I was one, and because I was often 
around them – is by telling themselves that they know bet-
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ter than the defendant what is really in his or her interest. 
“This fool doesn’t know what is going to happen at trial. 
I’ve tried 50 jury trial cases, six just like this, and all of my 
clients got slammed and they all got sentenced to zillions 
of years. So if I twist this guy’s arm to accept the plea, in 
fact it is for his benefit.” Lawyers abound in techniques to 
persuade the defendant to accept a plea. 
Now we will move on to the judge, or court. By law, 
judges have almost complete authority over sentencing. 
In our system, juries, in limited cases, such as death 
penalty cases, also have a role in sentencing. In far more 
typical cases, jurors do not have any part of sentencing, 
in fact, it is even improper to discuss sentencing before 
the jury. Sentencing is left to the court. This invests the 
court with the power to approve the terms of any agree-
ment that involves a sentence. 
Occasionally, in California at least, if the defense at-
torney and the prosecutor fail to reach an agreement, the 
defense attorney can negotiate directly with the court. The 
court may undercut an offer and give a lower sentence 
than the prosecutor is offering. However, under these cir-
cumstances, because the court does not have the discretion 
whether or not to charge and what to charge (that is the 
prosecutor’s role), and the court cannot force the prosecu-
tion to dismiss any charges, the defendant must plead guilty 
to everything that is alleged in the complaint. In California, 
this is called “pleading to the sheet” or “pleading open.”
Sometimes judges will take a hands off approach in the 
early stages of the case, leaving the negotiations to the two 
parties. But, as trial becomes imminent, then the interest of 
the court in avoiding the time and expense of trial rises, and 
judges tend to get actively involved in negotiations.
Just like a prosecutor cannot bargain away something 
he or she does not possess or control, the same is true of 
the defendant. The capacity to enter into a bargain derives 
in part from the fact that we conceive of jury trial as a 
right. This is enshrined in the federal constitution. This is 
one of the rights that has been held applicable in the way 
I described earlier through the 14th amendment to all of 
the states. The defendant has a right to a jury trial, and 
therefore, can trade away that right. Constitutional rights, 
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generally, in our system, can be waived, meaning to give up 
or surrender a legal right. As to constitutional rights, un-
der our law, these can be waived or given up if the waiver is 
“knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” It does require a cer-
tain kind of legal fiction to imagine a criminal defendant as 
“freely” accepting to a plea deal, for example involving five 
years in prison, when they would otherwise face a sentence 
of fifteen years. This implied threat of lengthy imprison-
ment is deemed legally irrelevant, however, and a guilty 
plea via a negotiation is not viewed as coerced. 
The Substance of the Exchange
Now, what is being exchanged in plea bargaining? What 
is the substance of a plea deal? The basics are simple: the 
prosecutor gives the defendant lesser consequences, usually 
meaning less time in custody. It is theoretically possible, and 
it does happen in minor cases, that the defendant can nego-
tiate for and receive outright dismissal of the case. For ex-
ample, if the defendant has vandalized a neighbor’s car and 
the defendant is willing to pay restitution and the neighbor 
agrees, the prosecutor may dismiss the case on condition 
that the defendant compensates the victim. Thus plea bar-
gaining can result in anything from dismissal to, in a death 
penalty case, a term of life without possibility of parole. 
While the prosecutor is giving lower criminal con-
sequences or possibly none at all, the defendant is giving 
back two things: the cost savings of trial and certainty of 
conviction. Certainty of conviction is of value to prosecu-
tors because they may recognize that some criminal liabil-
ity is better than none. They may assess that they could 
lose the case, and they would rather have a defendant serve 
two years than none at all. Also, low conviction rates reveal 
prosecutors to be wasting community resources, and thus 
subject them to possible political reprisal. 
It is important to understand that, for prosecutors, a 
guilty plea may be just a step along the way to the longer-term 
incarceration of the defendant. Here is an example of how this 
works. Defendant X is charged with possession of cocaine for 
sale. That is a felony in the state of California, punishable by 
three, four, or five years in a state prison. Defendant X is in 
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custody, as are most felony defendants in the state of Cali-
fornia. This is hugely important. Defendant X is desperate to 
get out of custody, and at the preliminary hearing, is offered 
a probationary sentence. Probation is a period of conditional 
liberty in which the defendant is released into the commu-
nity, and allowed to remain free as long as he abides by certain 
terms and conditions. The conditions range tremendously. 
The most fundamental one of every probationary case is that 
the defendant must not violate the law again. Very commonly 
in California defendants surrender their rights to be free of a 
search as a condition of probation.
 Defendant X accepts the offer, pleads guilty, and is re-
turned to the streets. Prosecutors know, however, that he is 
going to be back soon – two weeks, five weeks, seven weeks, 
it doesn’t matter much. Sure enough, Defendant X returns, 
having been arrested on a new case. Associated with proba-
tion, there is always a suspended sentence. If a defendant 
violates probation by getting arrested again, the suspended 
sentence is imposed and the defendant goes to prison.
Crucially, with a new offense, a person is entitled to 
a jury trial. With a probation revocation hearing, there 
is no such right. The probationer is entitled to a hearing, 
but it is before a judge, not a jury. The standard of proof 
is by a preponderance of the evidence, which is the low-
est standard in our legal system, not beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Evidence seized in an illegal search can be used in 
a probation revocation hearing. Hearsay, an out of court 
statement, can be used. In contrast to a jury trial, a proba-
tion revocation hearing is a highly expedient procedure, 
and revocation is nearly inevitable. 
While there is plea bargaining preceding probation 
revocation hearings, the defendant’s position is infinitely 
weaker than in a new case. For a prosecutor, then, a plea can 
be a cheap way and an expedient way to get almost the same 
results as a conviction at jury trial, but without all of the 
hassle, albeit with some delay. This is yet another value that 
prosecutors appreciate about plea negotiations.
Most plea bargaining starts with a reference to a “stan-
dard offer.” A standard offer is kind of the market rate for a 
particular kind of case. It is the usual kind of sentence that is 
offered for a particular kind of offense. These are established 
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in part by custom and also, within prosecutor’s offices, by su-
pervisorial oversight of prosecutors. The young prosecutors 
who are in the lower courts typically receive parameters from 
their superiors who say, “In this kind of case, this is the range 
you can offer and don’t go outside of these boundaries.”
Standard offers are justified by the need to avoid the ap-
pearance of arbitrariness. It is considered unseemly for there 
to be too much variation in punishments between cases in-
volving the same offense. What the attorneys generally ne-
gotiate is whether there are circumstances in aggravation, 
meaning things about the particular case that make it par-
ticularly nasty or unpleasant or factors in mitigation, things 
that indicate lesser culpability, that would justify deviating 
from the standards one way or the other. Much of plea bar-
gaining consists of discussions about whether a case devi-
ates in some way from a standard.
Attorneys have an expression, “to know what a case is 
worth.” It is said admiringly or approvingly by one lawyer 
about another. If I say that a certain lawyer “really knows 
what a case is worth,” I am paying him or her a compliment. 
What does it mean to “know what a case is worth?” Basi-
cally, this means to look through the case from beginning 
to end and to analyze what is likely to happen at each pro-
cedural step, and to make a fair and accurate prediction of 
outcome. 
What follows is a partial list of considerations that 
lawyers make when determining what a case is worth. Is 
there a motion to suppress evidence in this case on the 
grounds of an illegal search and seizure? If the motion 
were granted, will that gut the prosecution’s case and force 
dismissal, or will it merely weaken the case? Is it key or 
central evidence, or is it peripheral?
What is the defendant’s criminal history? What is his past 
experience with law enforcement? Does he have a lot of law 
enforcement contact or just a little? Are there patterns in the 
defendant’s criminal history, usually reflected in government 
maintained rap sheets or printouts of criminal history, which 
could be meaningful? Is the trajectory ascending, the offens-
es getting more and more serious over time, or is he on the 
downhill slope of his criminal career? Are there gaps in the 
criminal history? If someone was convicted 15 years ago, but 
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has been clean ever since, that is a different situation than if 
the criminal history were over just the last five years. 
 Does the defendant have other currently pending cases? 
It is not at all uncommon for defendants to have two or three 
active cases within one jurisdiction. These are busy people! 
Many defendants’ lives involve regular violations of criminal 
law, and sometimes they get caught up in two or three cases 
at a time. There is a volume discount in the Criminal Justice 
System. A defendant with three cases is much better off nego-
tiating them simultaneously rather than serially. 
Does the defendant have prior convictions that can be 
used against him at the trial? We have minimally explored the 
impact of priors on trials, but there are various ways in which 
prior convictions can be used against a defendant despite the 
general ban of character evidence. For example, defendants 
who testify may be impeached – that is, shown to be untrust-
worthy witnesses – with certain kinds of prior convictions. De-
pending on the nature of the prior, the risk may be too great for 
the defendant, thus depriving the defense of valuable options.
How sympathetic is the victim in this case, if there is one? 
Is the victim tremendously sympathetic or as obnoxious as the 
defendant? Or is the victim a flake who may not appear in court, 
or will “go sideways” on the stand? To go sideways means to sud-
denly start saying things totally different than what the witness 
previously said to the police or others. This does happen in jury 
trials. It is sometimes completely unpredictable. However, you 
can see it coming in some witnesses, or you might have seen it 
coming already at the preliminary hearing. 
If there are only police witnesses, are there personnel re-
cords that can be sought that might show past instances of police 
misconduct that you can use against the policeman at trial?
Are the particular facts of the offense ugly? Robbery in 
our law is the taking of anything of value from the person 
of another through the use of force or fear. A robbery of-
fense may involve only fear. For example, where a physically 
large defendant comes up and demands of a much smaller 
person “Can I have some change?” this could be charged as 
a robbery. Robbery with a gun is an entirely different case. 
The specific facts of how the offense was committed matter. 
Likewise consider two people charged with shoplifting: one 
has stolen a US$7 bottle of vodka, the other is charged with 
                        
789George E. Bisharat DILEMAS - Vol. 7 - no 3 - JUL/AGO/SET 2014 - pp. 767-795
stealing baby diapers. These are very different kinds of facts, 
but the same offense. One is more aggravated than the other. 
Is there a plausible defense in the case, particularly one 
that the prosecutor can see from the evidence that is in his 
or her file?
Is the defendant a veteran of the United States armed 
services? There is a “veteran discount” in plea bargaining. De-
fendants who have served in the armed forces receive special 
treatment. Just as some airlines permit veterans to board first 
these days, so veterans get a discount in plea bargaining.
There are many other idiosyncratic and human factors 
that influence what a case is worth. How competent at trial 
is the trial attorney? How good an attorney is the opposing 
counsel? Does that person have the guts to go to trial? Trial 
is a high stakes, high wire act. It is hard for lawyers, and a 
lot of lawyers are afraid to go to trial. All lawyers suffer a 
certain degree of performance anxiety. For some of us it is 
greater than for others. When your counterpart is afraid to 
go to trial, that is when you extract the greatest concessions 
in negotiations. Or, you know your opponent likes golf. He 
has been talking for six weeks about how he is going to go to 
Scotland on a golfing tour, and it is the week before his vaca-
tion. You know he isn’t going to cancel his trip to try a case, 
so he will give you exactly what you want. This, by the way, 
is a true example from my own practice experience.
If you are lucky enough to have your case hit calendar 
in the week between Christmas and New Year’s, no one at 
the Hall of Justice wants to try a case. They are adjourning at 
noon, having office parties, drinking and having a lot of fun. 
Plus, this is the season of generosity. If you are that lucky 
defendant, it is like a gold mine or a Christmas gift. 
One day you might have a visiting judge from out of 
county. Typical of visiting judges, they do not want to rock 
the boat or do anything unusual. Therefore, this is not the day 
you want to try and plea bargain your case. You are going to 
wait for a judge you know to return. Say, you spend a lot of 
time interacting with Judge Y. You happen to know that Judge 
Y is a gun nut. He is the only judge in the Hall of Justice in 
San Francisco who likes guns. So, if I have a gun case I want 
to be in front of Judge Y. Lawyers have some limited power to 
steer cases one way or another. The judges themselves are in 
                        
790 George E. BisharatDILEMAS - Vol. 7 - no 3 - JUL/AGO/SET 2014 - pp. 767-795
control of where cases go, but lawyers can finagle a little bit 
and steer their cases where they need them to go. 
There many other random factors like the above men-
tioned ones. 
Knowing what a case is worth reveals several of the link-
ages between jury trial and plea bargaining. First, it is basi-
cally a predictive process of analyzing a case and determining 
what would happen if this case were to go all the way to jury 
trial, as well as every stage along the way. It takes a lot of ex-
perience dealing with many different kinds of cases in order 
to develop that predictive judgment. Trial experience is thus 
crucial to developing plea bargaining judgment, and thus ef-
ficacy. Secondly, a good trial attorney instills fear in the op-
ponent and thus can extract concessions from the other side. 
Consider further that many of the factors previously 
described relate to the two basic things that the defendant 
can offer during plea bargaining: cost savings and certainty 
of conviction. How much court time can the defense take 
up with pretrial litigation and with a lengthy trial? How 
much pain and how much cost can the defense inflict on the 
system? That determines how much the defense can save it. 
That is what establishes the case’s value. If I have a case with 
a motion to strike a prior, a motion to suppress evidence, a 
motion to discover the records of the policeman’s miscon-
duct, those possibilities invest that case with greater value 
than a case that lacks them.
How much uncertainty is there concerning a convic-
tion? The more uncertainty, the more there is to give the 
prosecution in accepting a plea. If a prosecutor is not sure 
that he or she can secure a guilty verdict at trial, a plea bar-
gain is much more likely. If the prosecutor can see from the 
police report that there may be some issue of self-defense in 
an assault case, that would be treated differently than a case 
in which the facts are very straightforward.
The Timing of Plea Bargaining
When does plea bargaining occur? Plea bargaining 
happens at any point in the case. In fact, it is technically 
possible to happen even before a case is filed, and will con-
tinue intermittently all the way into trial. Plea negotiations 
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may occur after the trial has already started. Plea bargain-
ing is a process that unfolds over time. Agreements can 
be quick, but far more commonly plea negotiations un-
fold gradually during the procedural progress of the case 
through the courts. Every time that case is in court, when 
all the sides come together and the defendant is present, an 
opportunity for bargaining is presented.
There are particular moments in cases that are ripe for 
settlement. This is principally where either some resources are 
going to have to be expended, and thus, a plea would save those 
expenditures, or where uncertainty arises – or possibly both. For 
example, I, as defense attorney, may have a motion to suppress 
evidence in my case because I believe the police have performed 
an illegal search. Just before hearing, a prosecutor’s anxiety may 
be heightened; if my motion is granted, the prosecutor’s case is 
going to get weaker or may even evaporate entirely. So I would 
say, “Should we settle this case, we won’t have to go through this 
hour and half hearing and you will get your conviction, but in 
order for me to convince my client to accept this plea, you have 
to give me x.” Then the prosecutor will at least think about it 
more sympathetically than at other moments in the case.
The Secrecy Imperative
Where does plea bargaining occur? This may seem 
an odd or irrelevant question, but in fact it is very impor-
tant. Typically, plea bargaining occurs in the judge’s cham-
bers, that is, his or her private offices behind the courtroom 
somewhere. The key thing however, is that it almost always 
occurs in private, outside of public hearing. Plea negotiation 
sometimes occurs in the hallways in public spaces where the 
attorneys can be seen, but their actual negotiations are not 
overheard. They take pains to make sure that nobody else is 
overhearing their negotiations. And, crucially, these nego-
tiations happen outside of presence of the defendant.
Why are plea negotiations conducted in secrecy? There is 
a strong perception from all parties, prosecutors, defense at-
torneys, and the court, that secrecy or privacy is necessary to 
“successful” negotiations. By “successful” I simply mean nego-
tiations that lead to agreement, regardless how satisfying or dis-
satisfying the agreement is to the parties. Secrecy is necessary 
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because both sides may need the freedom to say or do things 
that they suspect either the public or the defendant may not ap-
prove. 
As an example, a defense attorney may distance himself 
from his client by saying, “This guys is totally unreasonable, 
I know. He is a jerk and will not do anything that I say. You 
know I will do my best to convince him to take this plea, but 
you better give me something so that I can get him to take the 
plea.” This positioning can be tactical. In other words, the de-
fense attorney might not really feel that way about the defen-
dant or he may actually be speaking sincerely. Either of those 
are a possibility. As you can imagine, a defendant wouldn’t ap-
preciate being described in those terms to opposing counsel. 
It could also be a judge observing how weak a particular 
prosecution witness is. A judge might do this in order to put 
pressure on a prosecutor to lower an offer. A judge might ob-
serve, “That victim is ridiculous and I sure as hell wouldn’t 
want to try a case with her as my lead witness.” Needless to 
say that is also not behavior that is particularly flattering or 
possible to be conducted in public. But, it can be effective in 
helping to propel a case forward to a disposition. 
Privacy is also necessary because of the ethically suspect 
practice of trade-offs between multiple cases. In many plea 
bargaining sessions, multiple cases are discussed. Efficiencies 
sometimes cause court calendars to concentrate all of an attor-
ney’s cases on the same day so that the attorney doesn’t race 
between multiple courts. Thus, one public defender might have 
eight cases set for preliminary hearing on the calendar, and 
would be negotiating not one, but eight cases in one session. 
Not explicitly, but tacitly, bargaining under these circumstances 
can amount to, “I will give you x on this case, if you give me y 
on the next.” You can only drive one hard bargain a morning, 
so you have to pick which case you are going to do that for. One 
of your clients benefits and the other one pays the price. How 
would you like to be the defendant that is paying the price? 
These trade-offs between cases simply cannot be made publicly. 
This is another reason why secrecy is necessary.
Defense attorneys are not all scheming fraudsters, who 
trick and coerce their clients into pleading guilty. Many are 
persons of great integrity and commitment. A combination of 
integrity and trial skills is an extremely powerful weapon in the 
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arsenal of a defense attorney and in a prosecutor too. If I, as 
a defense lawyer, assert to my prosecutor colleague, “I do not 
believe my client is guilty,” and she knows that I blow a lot of 
smoke, in other words, I am not truthful, then that will not 
mean much to her. I can blow all the smoke I want and she will 
ignore it. But, if we have tried cases before and she knows that I 
am a straight shooter, am honest, and that I have integrity – and 
that I am formidable at trial – she is going to listen to me when I 
say, “I do not believe that my client is guilty.” In this way lawyers 
can use their reputation to the benefit of their clients.
Conclusions
Let us conclude with a few observations about why a 
system that functions as the plea bargaining machine con-
tinues to characterize itself as a jury trial system. First, there 
is a sense in which it is correct to represent the US system 
as a jury trial system. This is true because plea bargaining is 
a production of, and is the flip side of the jury trial system. 
We may not have plea bargaining if we did not have jury tri-
als in the form that they have assumed in our contemporary 
legal system. In other words, the claim that this is jury trial 
system is still valid, but perhaps not complete.
Beyond that, however, is a question of legitimation, that is, 
how lawyers and judges present the legal system so as to invest 
it with authority before particular audiences. The relevant audi-
ences are, perhaps. three. First is the non-lawyer lay public in 
the United States itself – those who are not part of the legal sys-
tem. The second audience is defendants. The third is, in a sense, 
all of us in the United States in our dealings with the global 
community. With respect to all three of these audiences, it is far 
more ennobling of the legal profession and the legal system to 
think of it as resolving great issues and vital criminal prosecu-
tions by dramatic courtroom battles in which intellectual and 
oratorical skills are matched against each other in this clash. 
Doubtless, this is why popular culture so commonly 
depicts jury trial. You do not see television shows and 
movies that demonstrate plea bargaining. What you see are 
shows and movies that depict trial. Compare the image of 
the dramatic heroic courtroom battle to the reality of plea 
                        
794 George E. BisharatDILEMAS - Vol. 7 - no 3 - JUL/AGO/SET 2014 - pp. 767-795
bargaining, which can at times resemble haggling over cu-
cumbers in the market. That is not a very pretty picture, in 
its dehumanization of defendants. 
Part of the legal profession’s professional proj-
ect or responsibility is to convince the general public 
of its mastery of a specific form of expertise. That is 
what lawyers sell. If we do not have knowledge that is 
distinct from that of others, why should anyone pay 
us for anything? So we have to mark off our exper-
tise and distinguish it from other forms of expertise. 
Mastery of jury trials skills is much more distinct 
from everyday lay knowledge than bargaining skill. If 
you really want to be represented well in bargaining, 
you might go to a rug merchant, not a lawyer! They 
are better at negotiating then we are. I exaggerate, of 
course, because we have discussed the relationship 
between legal knowledge and the ability to negoti-
ate effectively, and a rug merchant would be as lost 
in plea bargaining as any other non-lawyer. But from 
the standpoint of the lay public, anybody can walk 
into the back room and negotiate, at least as well as a 
lawyer. So, trial skills are what differentiate the legal 
profession from that of other forms of expertise.
With respect to defendants as an audience before which 
we need to legitimate ourselves, this is perilous, because, as I 
said, the vast majority of defendants’ cases do not go to trial. 
But, it is still important for them to see it as a possibility and 
to see a guilty plea as an outcome influenced by trial realities 
as opposed to purely a product of negotiation.
The global community’s admiration and emula-
tion of the US legal system is a source of great pride 
in our legal profession. The export of American legal 
forms is a major business. We commonly host legal 
delegations from all over the world. I have person-
ally hosted many myself in San Francisco, from Ja-
pan, China, Eastern Europe, the Arab world, and else-
where. We rarely travel to those countries, at least not 
to learn how their legal systems operate with an eye 
toward reforming our own system. They always come 
to see what we do. When we do go abroad, it is usu-
ally to instruct others how to fix their legal systems 
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and model it after ours. The reflection US lawyers see 
in the global community’s response to us is I suspect, 
one of the fundaments of American exceptionalism. 
American exceptionalism is the belief that we are a 
uniquely endowed country, that we are special, and we 
may claim prerogatives and assume functions that oth-
ers in the international community cannot. That explains 
why a nation like mine can think of itself as a nation of 
laws and nonetheless hold such contempt for internation-
al law. We can kill people anywhere in the world with our 
weaponized drones, sovereignty of others be damned. 
Nobody else can do that (other than our protégé, Israel). 
The simple fact is that we think our laws are superior to 
anyone’s. Nobody is going to tell us that our drone assas-
sinations violate international law. What is international 
law? Now, obviously, this is not the perspective of every 
person in the United States, but this is a perspective and 
it is held quite strongly and quite openly by many power-
ful people. Our former president, and to some extent our 
current president, seem to hold this position. 
Perhaps this relationship between how we conduct 
ourselves in the international community and our jury trial 
system seems implausible. I personally believe pride in our 
legal system and faith in its superiority is a core feature of 
American exceptionalism. For better or for worse, I see no 
inclination from within the legal profession or outside of it 
– none whatsoever – to question the plea bargain machine. 
It will, accordingly, rumble on indefinitely into the future.
